Nipped in the Bud: How Legal Disparities Create Financial Growth Hurdles in the State-Sanctioned Marijuana Industry and Why Bankruptcy Courts Can Provide a Remedy by Cullen, Caitlyn
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 74 Number 1 Article 8 
11-22-2019 
Nipped in the Bud: How Legal Disparities Create Financial Growth 
Hurdles in the State-Sanctioned Marijuana Industry and Why 
Bankruptcy Courts Can Provide a Remedy 
Caitlyn Cullen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Caitlyn Cullen, Nipped in the Bud: How Legal Disparities Create Financial Growth Hurdles in the State-
Sanctioned Marijuana Industry and Why Bankruptcy Courts Can Provide a Remedy, 74 U. Miami L. Rev. 
310 (2019) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol74/iss1/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




Nipped in the Bud: How Legal Disparities 
Create Financial Growth Hurdles in the 
State-Sanctioned Marijuana Industry and 
Why Bankruptcy Courts Can Provide a 
Remedy 
CAITLYN CULLEN* 
A new marijuana industry has emerged in the United 
States in the wake of state-by-state legalization of mariju-
ana, and entrepreneurs, investors, and other advisory ser-
vices are increasingly viewing the marijuana industry as an 
area of legitimate business opportunity. However, potential 
investors have been hesitant to establish formal relation-
ships with marijuana businesses that operate legitimately in 
the eyes of the state but in a cloud of legal uncertainty at the 
federal level because the Controlled Substances Act crimi-
nalizes marijuana. This Note identifies two economic conse-
quences of the conflicts of state and federal law and suggests 
a temporary solution that would allow states to capture the 
financial benefits of this industry while the federal govern-
ment works towards a more permanent, nation-wide solu-
tion. 
The first economic consequence that this Note identifies 
is that foreign marijuana companies have strategic ad-
vantages over U.S. marijuana companies. Investors prefer 
foreign marijuana companies, particularly those in Canada, 
instead of the U.S. companies operating in a similar manner. 
Further, some of these foreign marijuana companies have 
successfully listed on public U.S. stock exchanges while their 
domestic counterparts have not been able to, giving foreign 
competitors greater access to U.S. capital markets than U.S 
marijuana companies.  
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The second economic consequence this Note discusses is 
that marijuana companies have been precluded from seeking 
the protections of bankruptcy law. This Note also suggests 
that federal bankruptcy courts are equipped to address some 
of the financial consequences created by this legal disparity. 
In doing so, they could provide a greater level of comfort to 
investors and encourage legitimate business development, 
thus allowing states that have chosen to legalize marijuana 
to realize the economic benefits of the industry while the fed-
eral government navigates the broader issue of federal pol-
icy on marijuana. 
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The “legal” marijuana industry in the United States was esti-
mated to be worth $8.5 billion in 2017, based solely on revenue from 
the states that legalized marijuana for medicinal or recreational sales 
at the time.1 Despite federal prohibition of marijuana use, distribu-
tion, and sales under the Controlled Substances Act,2 many states 
                                                                                                             
* J.D. Candidate 2020, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank 
Professor Kathleen Claussen for her guidance and invaluable feedback throughout 
the process of writing this Note. I would also like to thank the University of Miami 
Law Review for introducing me to such a wonderful group of people to work with, 
and the University of Miami Law Review Editors, in particular, for their dedication 
and insightful edits. Finally, this Note would not be complete without expressing 
my sincerest thanks to my family and friends. They are my sounding board and 
constant source of encouragement, and I am forever grateful for their love, humor, 
and support. 
 1 Thomas Pellechia, In 2017 and Beyond, U.S. Enjoys The Highest Legal 
Cannabis Market Share Worldwide, FORBES (June 26, 2018, 10:24 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomaspellechia/2018/06/26/in-2017-beyond-u-s-
enjoys-the-highest-legal-cannabis-market-share-worldwide/#15ef8a892d20; see 
also Arcview Group, Legal Marijuana Markets Projected to Reach $23.4 Billion, 
Employ Nearly a Half-Million Americans by 2022; Effective End of Federal Pro-





 2 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812 (2012). 
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have forged ahead with their own laws legalizing medicinal mariju-
ana and, increasingly, recreational marijuana for adults.3 With the 
state legalization trend expected to continue,4 the legal marijuana 
market in the United States is projected to be worth $23 billion by 
2022,5 and U.S. investors are taking note.6 
In 2018, Canada legalized recreational marijuana use nation-
wide.7 Not only did this ignite reactions in Canadian markets,8 but 
it also sparked reactions from U.S. entrepreneurs, businesses, and 
                                                                                                             
 3 As of October 2019, marijuana is legal for adult recreational use in ten 
states plus Washington D.C. Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/mariju-
ana-overview.aspx (last updated July 26, 2019). These states include: Alaska 
(2014), California (2016), Colorado (2012), Maine (2016), Massachusetts (2016), 
Michigan (2018), Nevada (2016), Oregon (2014), Vermont (2018), and Washing-
ton (2012). Id. In May 2019, Illinois passed the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act, 
which will allow legal sales of adult-use marijuana to begin in January 2020. Id. 
Marijuana is legal for medical use in thirty-three states plus Washington D.C. (in-
clusive of the ten recreational use states). See State Medical Marijuana Laws, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (last updated July 2, 2019). 
These states are: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Washington D.C., Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and 
West Virginia. Id. In addition to these thirty-three states with comprehensive med-
ical marijuana regulations, thirteen states allow for the use of low-THC/high-CBD 
products in a limited number of medical situations or as a legal defense. Id. In 
total, forty-six of the fifty United States permit some form of marijuana use or 
distribution. See id. 
 4 See Amanda Chicago Lewis, Why 2019 Will Be the Year of Weed, ROLLING 
STONE (Jan. 2, 2019, 4:27 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-
features/2019-weed-marijuana-cannabis-what-to-expect-774035/. 
 5 Arcview Group, supra note 1; see also Pellechia, supra note 1. 
 6 See infra Part II.A; see also Lewis, supra note 4 (“Corporate behemoths 
like Altria (parent company of Marlboro cigarettes) and Constellation 
Brands (parent of Corona beer and Svedka vodka) made multi-billion dollar weed 
investments.”). 
 7 Cannabis Legalization and Regulation, CAN. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/cannabis/ (last visited July 13, 2019). 
 8 See Big Bongs, Little Bang, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2018) https://www.econ-
omist.com/the-americas/2018/10/13/the-main-high-from-canadas-cannabis-le-
galisation-is-financial. 
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financial markets in the United States.9 In August 2018, after Can-
ada’s legalization, U.S. company Constellation Brands10 announced 
a $4 billion investment in Canadian cannabis company Canopy 
Growth Corporation.11 This was the “first multi-billion dollar deal 
in the [marijuana] space” and it drew support from top U.S. invest-
ment banks.12 The deal was advised by Goldman Sachs and financed 
by Bank of America, signifying that “the top-tier bankers have made 
their presence known at the cannabis deal-making table.”13 As states 
across America continue to liberalize their marijuana laws,14 mari-
juana is shifting “to the mainstream investment sector”15 and is in-
creasingly being viewed as a legitimate and lucrative business op-
portunity.16 Constellation, which prides itself on being “at the fore-
front of consumer trends,”17 sees its investment in the Canadian ma-
rijuana company as a way to ensure that it is poised for growth in 
medicinal marijuana markets around the world, as well as a first-
mover advantage in the anticipated recreational marijuana market in 
the United States.18 
                                                                                                             
 9 See, e.g., Steve Gelsi, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs Get Behind Con-
stellation Brands’ Cannabis Play, REAL MONEY (Aug. 15, 2018, 2:05 PM), 
https://realmoney.thestreet.com/articles/08/15/2018/bank-america-goldman-
sachs-get-behind-constellation-brands-cannabis-play. 
 10 Constellation Brands is a Fortune 500 company best known for its iconic 
beverage brands including Corona, Funky Buddha Brewery, Kim Crawford 
Wines, and Svedka. See generally CONSTELLATION BRANDS, COMPANY PROFILE 
1–22 (2019), https://companyprofile.cbrands.com/assets/dist/CBI-2019-
Company-Profile.pdf [hereinafter CONSTELLATION COMPANY PROFILE]. 
 11 See Constellation Brands to Invest $5 Billion CAD ($4 Billion USD) in 
Canopy Growth to Establish Transformative Global Position and Alignment, 
CONSTELLATION BRANDS (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.cbrands.com/news/arti-
cles/constellation-brands-to-invest-5-billion-cad-4-billion-usd-in-canopy-
growth-to-establish-transformative-global-position-and-alignment [hereinafter 
Constellation to Invest $4 Billion in Canopy Growth]. 
 12 Gelsi, supra note 9. 
 13 Id. 
 14 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 15 Gelsi, supra note 9. 
 16 See Lewis, supra note 4. 
 17 CONSTELLATION COMPANY PROFILE, supra note 10, at 5. 
 18 See Constellation to Invest $4 Billion in Canopy Growth, supra note 11. 
(The funds will be used to “establish global scale in the nearly 30 countries 
pursuing a federally permissible medical cannabis program, while also rap-
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Regardless of the arguments for and against federal legalization 
of marijuana, the current reality is that a new marijuana industry has 
emerged in the United States in the wake of state-by-state legaliza-
tion,19 bringing with it economic opportunities.20 Ironically, at a 
time when the national conversation is so often focused on strength-
ening the domestic economy,21 conflicts of state and federal law22 
prevent this industry from realizing its full economic potential.23 Be-
cause marijuana is illegal under federal law,24 institutional investors 
and banks have been hesitant to provide services to U.S. marijuana 
businesses,25 and these marijuana businesses have been precluded 
from seeking the protection of bankruptcy law. While the legal con-
flicts are constraining the potential economic benefits from these 
                                                                                                             
idly laying the global foundation needed for new recreational cannabis mar-
kets. . . . [M]anagement views other jurisdictions, including the United 
States, as strategic priorities requiring significant capital.”). 
 19 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 20 While the terms “marijuana industry” and “marijuana business” may en-
compass ancillary services like medical research, pesticide and agricultural ser-
vices, and marketing services, this Note uses those terms to refer solely to the 
cultivators, distributors, and dispensaries of medical and recreational marijuana 
in state-sanctioned industries, unless noted otherwise. 
 21  See generally Proclamation No. 9816, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,457 (Nov. 6, 2018). 
[W]e celebrate the Americans who forge new frontiers of pos-
sibility and prosperity, and we reaffirm our commitment to cre-
ating an environment in which they can continue to drive our 
country’s economic success. . . . My Administration is commit-
ted to policies that foster entrepreneurship and create 
jobs . . . Americans have experienced an overall decrease in 
regulatory burdens. We will not let up. Americans deserve a 
regulatory environment that facilitates innovation, rewards cre-
ativity, and allows the skills and dexterity of our entrepreneurs 
to shine. 
Id. at 55,457. 
 22 Compare Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 Schedule I(c)(10), 
841 (2012), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 26000(b) (2016). 
 23 See infra Part II. 
 24 21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 841. 
 25 See infra Part II.A; see also Hilary Bricken, Funding and Financing a Ma-
rijuana Business, SCITECH LAW, Spring 2017, at 6–7 [hereinafter Bricken, Fund-
ing and Financing]; Kevin Murphy, Legal Marijuana: The $9 Billion Industry 
That Most Banks Won’t Touch, FORBES (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmurphy/2018/09/06/legal-marijuana-the-9-
billion-industry-that-most-banks-wont-touch/#4466e4263c68. 
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businesses, they are not stifling demand or investment interest in the 
industry in the same way, which is giving foreign competitors a stra-
tegic advantage.26 
Despite these challenges, the U.S. state-legalized marijuana in-
dustry has a strong growth trajectory and continues to gain social, 
political, and financial interest.27 Consequently, there are economic 
incentives for the legal system to address some of the conflicts be-
tween state and federal law to allow the existing industry to access 
the nation’s financial resources and encourage economic growth, 
development, and stability.28 This Note explores how the disparity 
between state and federal marijuana laws creates financial hurdles 
to industry growth and, without taking a stance on federal legaliza-
                                                                                                             
 26 See infra Part II.B; see also Luke Scheuer, The “Legal” Marijuana Indus-
try’s Challenge for Business Entity Law, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 511, 545–
47 (2015). 
 27 See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 6 (“Though mari-
juana remains federally illegal, more than half of the states have various versions 
of legalized marijuana, with at least a half dozen more states expected to legalize 
within the next two years. With the growth in legalization, the potential for profits 
in the cannabis industry continues to increase at an exponential pace. The 2016 
Marijuana Business Factbook predicts the cannabis industry will grow from a 
$14–$16 billion market in 2016 to a $44 billion market by 2020—an approximate 
300 percent increase in just four years.”). 
 28 See John Horn & Darren Pleasance, Restarting the US Small-Business 
Growth Engine, MCKINSEY & CO. (Nov. 2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/fea-
tured-insights/employment-and-growth/restarting-the-us-small-business-growth-
engine#0 (“While the small-business universe is vast, its real economic impact comes 
disproportionately from a much smaller subset of high-growth firms. . . . [A] subset of 
small businesses—high-growth ones—creates the vast majority of new jobs. . . . The 1 
percent of all firms that are growing most quickly (fewer than 60,000 in all) account 
for 40 percent of economy-wide net new job creation. To provide a sense of magnitude, 
high-growth firms add an average of 88 employees a year, while the average non-high-
growth company only adds 2 to 3.”); see also ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL., WORLD 
BANK, FINANCE FOR ALL? POLICIES AND PITFALLS IN EXPANDING ACCESS 55 (2008), 
https://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFINFORALL/Resources/4099583-
1194373512632/FFA_book.pdf (“It is by providing financial services to any and all 
firms with good growth opportunities that the financial sector helps developing 
economies to grow and to converge on the high-income levels of advanced econ-
omies. This is not just a matter of the overall volume of lending: it matters cru-
cially which firms get finance and on what terms, that is, on whether creditworthy 
firms of all sizes, both incumbent ones and those that seek entry, have broad ac-
cess to finance at reasonable costs.”). 
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tion of marijuana, proposes other ways that the legal system can fos-
ter a business environment for this nascent industry to flourish, al-
lowing states to benefit from the full economic potential of the mar-
ket. Recognizing that there are certain objections to the use of mari-
juana, this Note does not address the moral and health arguments for 
its criminalization. Notwithstanding the highly contested nature of 
the moral and health objections to nationwide legalization, this Note 
assumes those objections will ultimately be overcome and solely fo-
cuses on the business opportunity of the state-sanctioned marijuana 
industry and how the legal system can support the realization of its 
economic potential. 
This Note examines the relationship between institutional inves-
tors and the U.S. marijuana industry and identifies access to capital 
markets and bankruptcy as challenges that strain the relationship. 
This strained relationship creates financial hurdles to growth for the 
marijuana industry by (1) diverting available capital of investors in-
terested in the marijuana market from domestic marijuana industry 
to foreign marijuana operations, 29 and (2) preventing marijuana 
businesses from accessing the federal bankruptcy system, which 
creates uncertainty for the already-limited pool of lenders and dis-
courages an influx of new capital.30 While bankruptcy is typically 
associated with failing businesses, the bankruptcy system lends sta-
bility to markets by providing insolvent businesses and their credi-
tors with a predictable process to obtain the best possible value in a 
worst-case scenario.31 The state-sanctioned marijuana industry is 
still a young industry and has yet to exhibit large-scale financial 
downturns, but no industry is completely immune to the peaks and 
pitfalls of macroeconomic cycles32 or the risks of new businesses.33 
The risks are even higher if the industry is precluded from federal 
                                                                                                             
 29 See infra Part II.A. 
 30 See infra Part II.B. 
 31 See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 545–46; see also William Gamble, Signifi-
cance of Bankruptcy and Economic Growth, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 4, 2010, 6:39 
AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/191890-significance-of-bankruptcy-and-
economic-growth. 
 32 Cf. Eric Rosenberg, 5 Recession Resistant Industries, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 
27, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/100115/5-recession-
resistant-industries.asp (describing certain industries that, while not completely 
recession-proof, feel less dramatic effects of economic swings). 
 33 See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7. 
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bankruptcy protection because businesses and their creditors will 
not be able to predict the process and legal remedies available in the 
case of a business’s failure.34 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Controlled Sub-
stances Act and other federal laws relevant to investments in the ma-
rijuana industry. It also briefly summarizes the process of marijuana 
legalization in the United States and factors contributing to the con-
fusion surrounding liability. In the discussion of liability, this Note 
focuses on the legal risks to the financial industry born out of the 
tension between state and federal laws. Part II explores how these 
liability risks affect the relationship between institutional investors 
and the marijuana industry. After exploring the industry’s ability to 
raise capital in Part II, this Note then discusses the industry’s ability 
(more accurately, lack of ability) to access the federal bankruptcy 
system when capital becomes too sparse. Part III of this Note pro-
poses that courts create a business environment more favorable to 
industry growth by allowing state-sanctioned marijuana businesses 
access to federal bankruptcy protection. The proposal is divided into 
two parts. The first part argues that marijuana businesses that are 
considered legitimate by the state should be eligible for federal 
bankruptcy protection because that approach is more consistent with 
the goals of bankruptcy. The second part explores how bankruptcy 
eligibility could address some of the problems presented by the dis-
connect between state and federal laws, thus achieving an econom-
ically desirable objective without requiring Congress to confront the 
larger, more contentious issue of federal marijuana legalization. 
I. CONFLICTING LEGAL STATUS OF THE MARIJUANA INDUSTRY 
Following the November 2018 midterm elections, thirty-three 
states and Washington D.C. have legalized medical marijuana, and, 
of those, ten states and Washington D.C. have legalized marijuana 
for recreational use by adults.35 While legalization at the state level 
                                                                                                             
 34 Jay D. Befort, Ongoing Saga of Medical Marijuana: What’s A Bank and A 
Debtor to Do?, 35 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2016, at 32, 33–34. 
 35 See State Marijuana Laws, supra note 3; see also Marijuana Overview, 
supra note 3. Under the Supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law 
preempts state laws whenever there is a direct conflict between the two, but there 
remains unsettled debate regarding the preemptive reach of the federal Controlled 
Substances Act over state laws that regulate the use, production, and distribution 
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has gained momentum and public support,36 federal law prohibits 
marijuana for both medical and recreational purposes.37 The Obama 
and Trump Administrations have expressed conflicting views on the 
federal legalization of marijuana, however neither has demonstrated 
clear efforts to protect or prosecute state-sanctioned marijuana busi-
nesses.38 Although the momentum of state law is encouraging the 
economic development of the marijuana industry,39 the inconsistent 
stance of federal administrations and lack of clear policy regarding 
the legitimacy of state-sanctioned marijuana businesses40 has cre-
ated apprehension about the criminal liability that may result from 
transacting with marijuana businesses, and consequently has a 
dampening effect on that development. 
                                                                                                             
of marijuana within their borders. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Scott 
Bomboy, Federal Marijuana Policy Change Raises Significant Questions, 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER (Jan. 4, 2018), https://constitution-
center.org/blog/federal-marijuana-policy-change-raises-significant-questions. 
While some believe there is a direct conflict that would allow the federal law to 
invalidate state laws legalizing marijuana, others look to the Tenth Amendment’s 
preservation of states’ rights to create and enforce laws on all issues not expressly 
reserved to the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Erwin 
Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana, 62 UCLA L. REV. 
74, 100–04 (2015); Bomboy, supra. Furthermore, the Tenth Amendment’s anti-
commandeering clause provides that the federal government cannot force states 
to pass certain laws or require state and local officials to enforce the laws of the 
federal government. See Chemerinsky et al., supra, at 102–03. Thus, while states’ 
laws decriminalizing marijuana cannot prevent the federal government from pros-
ecuting offenders of federal laws within those states’ territories, the federal gov-
ernment cannot require the states to pass and enforce their own laws criminalizing 
marijuana. See id. The preemption question that the Supreme Court has declined 
to address on multiple occasions is whether states’ laws legalizing and regulating 
marijuana within their borders create a direct and impermissible conflict with fed-
eral Controlled Substances Act. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 
(2016); see also Chemerinsky et al., supra, at 101. 
 36 A recent Gallop poll estimates that “[s]ixty-six percent of Americans now 
support legalizing marijuana.” Justin McCarthy, Two in Three Americans Now 
Support Legalizing Marijuana, GALLUP (Oct. 22, 2018), https://news.gal-
lup.com/poll/243908/two-three-americans-support-legalizing-marijuana.aspx. 
 37 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 812 (2012). 
 38 See infra Part I.C. 
 39 See State Marijuana Laws, supra note 3; see also Marijuana Overview, 
supra note 3. 
 40 See infra Part I.C. 
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A. Criminal Liability Under the Controlled Substances Act 
Under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), it is illegal to 
“manufacture, distribute, or dispense”41 marijuana, which is classi-
fied as a Schedule I substance.42 Schedule I substances carry the 
most severe legal penalties and are characterized as follows: 
(1) Schedule I.— 
(A) The drug or other substance has a high po-
tential for abuse. 
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States. 
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of 
the drug or other substance under medical super-
vision.43 
Depending on the weight or amount of a Schedule I substance, 
penalties for manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing marijuana 
can range from a probationary period for first time offenders found 
with small amounts, to a minimum sentence of ten years imprison-
ment with a fine of up to $10 million for first time offenders found 
with 1,000 kilograms of any substance containing marijuana or 
1,000 marijuana plants.44 The CSA directly implicates marijuana 
cultivation, distribution, and dispensary businesses,45 but the poten-
tial federal criminal liability does not seem to have dissuaded these 
businesses from entering the thriving state-legitimized markets.46 In 
fact, with 1,025 licensed dispensaries in Colorado as of August 1, 
                                                                                                             
 41 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
 42 Id. § 812 Schedule I(c)(10). 
 43 Id. § 812(b)(1). 
 44 See id. § 841; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a)(2012). 
 45 Marijuana cultivation, distribution, and dispensary businesses are engaged 
in the three specific activities that the CSA criminalized. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
 46 See MED Resources and Statistics, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/med-resources-and-statistics (last 
updated Aug. 1, 2019). 
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2019, 47 there are now over three times more marijuana dispensaries 
than Starbucks stores in the state.48 
Criminal liability under the CSA extends beyond those directly 
engaged in the business to stakeholders that support or benefit from 
the business in a number of ways.49 Leasing or mortgaging property 
to marijuana cultivators and dispensaries, for example, could result 
in up to twenty years in prison and a $2 million dollar fine under the 
CSA.50 It is also illegal to use income derived from illegal drug ac-
tivities in any business that directly or indirectly affects interstate or 
foreign commerce.51 In today’s technology-dependent economy, it 
is a rarity to find a company that does not affect interstate or foreign 
commerce through internet usage in some way.52 If the marijuana 
cultivators or dispensaries were, in fact, prosecuted and convicted 
                                                                                                             
 47 See id. 
 48 There are 322 Starbucks stores in Colorado. Lifestyle Statistics: Starbucks 
Stores (Most Recent) by State, STATEMASTER, http://www.statemas-
ter.com/graph/lif_sta_sto-lifestyle-starbucks-stores (last visited July 13, 2019); 
see also Scheuer, supra note 26, at 521–22 (noting the rapid growth of the mari-
juana industry, evidenced by the greater number of dispensaries than Starbucks 
stores in a handful of states with legalized marijuana); see also How Many Dis-
pensaries Are in Denver, Colorado?, 420 TOURS (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://my420tours.com/many-dispensaries-denver-colorado/ (finding the num-
ber of dispensaries in Denver outnumbers the amount of Starbucks stores and 
McDonalds stores in the city, combined, but this comparison may be slightly 
skewed because differing town ordinances on possession lead to a concentration 
of dispensaries in possession-friendly towns.). 
 49 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 856 (a)–(b). 
 50 Id.; see also In re Rent-Rite Super Kegs W. Ltd., 484 B.R. 799, 803–07 
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2012) (holding that a property manager who leased a warehouse 
to a marijuana cultivator was engaged in conduct that violated the CSA, which 
therefore provided cause to dismiss the property manager’s Chapter 11 claim for 
Bankruptcy relief). 
 51 21 U.S.C. § 854(a). 
 52 See Brittany Yantis et al., Money Laundering, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1469, 
1485–86 (2018). Both financial transaction and proceeds of illegal activity are de-
fined very broadly. Id.; see also JAMES KILLICK ET AL., WHITE & CASE, GLOBAL 
INVESTIGATIONS: READING THE SIGNALS 9 (2014), https://www.white-
case.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/publications/whitecase_globalin-
vestigations_readingthesignals.pdf (“Many US laws . . . may establish jurisdic-
tion over a crime whenever it involves the use of any ‘means or instrumentality 
of interstate or foreign commerce.’ The term is broadly defined by US authorities 
and may cover any communication or movement that crosses state or international 
borders, including wire transfers, emails, phone calls, mail and travel.”). 
322 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:310 
 
for violating the CSA, all of the assets of the business—not just the 
plants or related products—could be subject to government forfei-
ture,53 leaving creditors and entrepreneurs without any collateral or 
residual value.54 This potential confiscation of assets decreases their 
value as collateral to lenders.55 Furthermore, the financial risk of as-
set forfeiture may be compounded with criminal liability under the 
continuing criminal enterprise provision of the CSA.56 If the nature 
of a relationship between a stakeholder and marijuana business is 
criminalized under the CSA, the actions of the stakeholder could be 
seen as a continuing series of violations which would render the 
stakeholder as one “engag[ed] in a continuing criminal enter-
prise.”57 Such a finding could severely increase criminal penalties 
beyond what could have been imposed for the underlying violation, 
adding criminal liability risks on top of the financial risk of collat-
eral seizure.58 
B. Investors’ Criminal Liability Under Anti-Money 
Laundering Laws 
In addition to the array of activities criminalized by the CSA,59 
marijuana business stakeholders, like investors and financial service 
providers, may encounter risks with other federal laws because of 
the federal prohibition of marijuana.60 The federal anti-money laun-
dering statutes impose criminal liability on anyone who engages in 
                                                                                                             
 53 See 21 U.S.C. § 853. 
 54 See Befort, supra note 34, at 33; see also Bricken, Funding and Financing, 
supra note 25, at 7. 
 55 See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7 (describing how 
marijuana businesses are vulnerable to asset forfeiture, creating financial, as well 
as criminal risks for lenders). 
 56 See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). An individual found to be in violation of the con-
tinuing criminal enterprise statute will be subject to both asset forfeiture and in-
creased prison and fines sentences. Id. 
 57 Id. An action is considered part of the continuing series of violations if (1) 
the action itself is a felony, (2) it is undertaken with at least five other people with 
whom the defendant has a managerial or supervisory relationship, and (3) a sub-
stantial amount of income is derived from the action. Id. 
 58 See id.; see also Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7. 
 59 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848. 
 60 See Befort, supra note 34, at 32. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 323 
 
a financial transaction knowing that the money involved is the “pro-
ceeds of some form of unlawful activity.”61 Since the growing and 
selling of marijuana is illegal under federal law,62 any bank, inves-
tor, or supplier who accepts money from such a business could be 
liable for money laundering.63 While the initial act of a bank lending 
or investing in a marijuana business might not trigger money laun-
dering laws because the funds flowing from the bank to the busi-
nesses are presumably still untainted, a bank’s subsequent ac-
ceptance of loan repayments reverses the flow of funds.64 Once the 
funds flow from the marijuana business (that is illegal in the eyes of 
federal law) to the bank, the payment could be seen as a financial 
transaction with illegally derived funds.65 Thus, under money laun-
dering statutes, banks may loan out money but not get repaid.66 Such 
                                                                                                             
 61 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2012). Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57, parties on 
both sides of the transaction are liable for money laundering, so the legal party 
beings used to “clean” the illegal proceeds (financial institutions, for the purpose 
of this Note) can be liable separately from the criminal enterprise. See id. 
§§ 1956–57. 
 62 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). 
 63 See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7); see also FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T 
OF THE TREASURY, FIN–2014–G001, BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING 
MARIJUANA-RELATED BUSINESSES 4 n.7 (2014) [hereinafter FinCEN 2014 Bank-
ing Guidance]. 
 64 See Yantis, supra note 52, at 1478–82. The four elements required to prove 
money laundering under 18 U.S.C.§ 1956 are (1) knowledge that the transaction 
included illegally derived funds (even if the specific type of illegal activity is un-
known); (2) the money involved must be proceeds derived from illegal activity; 
(3) an attempted or completed financial transaction; and (4) intent either to pro-
mote the underlying activity, evade taxes, or conceal the illegal nature of the funds 
in some way. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). 
 65 See Yantis, supra note 52, at 1478–82. While the movement of money 
through a wire transfer or other means or any transaction with a bank engaged in 
interstate commerce constitutes the requisite type of financial transaction for 
money laundering, the funds are clean until they cross over to the marijuana busi-
ness. Once the marijuana business has handled the funds, however, they can be 
tied directly or indirectly to illegal activities. See id. Even if the marijuana busi-
ness uses money from a federally legal source to pay its obligations to the bank, 
a comingling of clean and illegal assets is sufficient to jeopardize the validity of 
the business’s entire asset pool and, therefore, any transactions it tries to initiate 
with a bank. See id. at 1480–83. 
 66 See Befort, supra note 34, at 33–34. 
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a transaction is typically considered a gift, not a loan,67 and is insuf-
ficient to attract the capital resources necessary for industry 
growth.68 
Furthermore, a violation of anti-money laundering laws is also 
considered a violation of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) laws.69 In the most extreme cases, such a violation “could 
ultimately lead to termination of FDIC insurance” for the violating 
                                                                                                             
 67 A gift is defined as “[t]he voluntary transfer of property to another without 
compensation,” or “[a] thing so transferred” while a loan is defined as “[a] thing 
lent for the borrower’s temporary use; esp., a sum of money lent at interest.” Com-
pare Gift, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), with Loan, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 68 Cf. DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT ET AL., supra note 28 (describing how economic growth 
relies on availability of credit and financing). A gift could still trigger liability directly 
under the CSA as aiding and abetting or conspiring with an illegal business. See 
Brad Scheick, Do You Feel Lucky, Bankers? The Shaky Prospects for Financial 
Transactions with Marijuana-Related Businesses, 28 MILLER & STARR REAL EST. 
NEWSALERT 459, 460 (2018). 
 69 See Scheick, supra note 68, at 462. The FDIC is a government agency that 
provides stability to the United States financial system by insuring bank deposits 
of $250,000 per customer per bank. Insurance Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/insurance.html (last up-
dated Jan. 29, 2018). Even if a bank fails, customers’ savings and checking ac-
count balances are still protected by the U.S. government through the FDIC. Id. 
FDIC insurance is a crucial consumer protection tool and has become very com-
mon at banks across the nation. See Chizoba Mora, Are All Bank Accounts Insured 
by the FDIC?, INVESTOPEDIA (last updated May 27, 2019), https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/ask/answers/08/fdic-insured-bank-account.asp. 
Almost all consumer banks are FDIC insured, but cash transfer apps like Venmo 
are not. See id.; Lauren Lyons Cole, Venmo Just Settled with the FTC Over Alle-
gations It Misled Users—And I Found the Little-Known App That Will Replace It 
Once and for All, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:44 PM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/venmo-apple-pay-cash-vs-zelle-2017-12. Highlighting the prob-
lems of keeping cash in a non-FDIC insured account, Venmo recently settled a 
lawsuit alleging that it misled consumers by claiming it had “bank-grade security 
systems” but was not actually FDIC insured, and, on multiple occasions, pre-
vented customers from cashing-out and caused them to lose money they thought 
they actually had. Id. 
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financial institution,70  a fate akin to financial suicide for banks.71 
Unlike the cultivation, distribution, and dispensary businesses di-
rectly engaged in the marijuana market, stakeholders like financial 
institutions seem hesitant to enter the lucrative marijuana industry.72 
C. Hazy Enforcement Policies of Federal Administrations 
Because of the array of risks the marijuana industry presents to 
a growing population of stakeholders, different presidential admin-
istrations have made efforts to provide legal clarity on enforcement 
policies in the industry.73 While medical marijuana programs have 
existed in states since the late 1990s,74 state legalization of recrea-
tional marijuana did not begin until 2012, with Colorado and Wash-
ington being the first.75 With the momentum of recreational legali-
zation drastically increasing the number of individuals who could 
violate the CSA as business owners and consumers,76 the ability to 
criminalize this growing population rests squarely on the shoulders 
of federal prosecutors.77 As the need for federal clarification on the 
enforcement of the CSA becomes increasingly apparent, the federal 
government’s response has been inconsistent, adding uncertainty to 
the risk of prosecution. 
                                                                                                             
 70 Bank Secrecy Act Examination Program Overview, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. (last updated Feb. 20, 2009), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examina-
tions/bsa/; see also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (the FDIC may termi-
nate insurance for a financial institution that has “violated any applicable law, 
regulation, order . . .”). 
 71 See Scheick, supra note 68, at 462. 
 72 See Murphy, supra note 25; infra Part II. 
 73 See infra Part I.C. 
 74 See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 3. 
 75 See Marijuana Overview, supra note 3. 
 76 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 77 Cf. Scheuer, supra note 26, at 527–28 (“it is probably safe to say that if 
medical marijuana dispensaries are still considered illegal and an option for pros-
ecution by the federal government exists, then a recreational marijuana dispensary 
would be at even more risk. In November 2013, one month before the law went 
into effect, federal agents raided numerous marijuana dispensaries in Colorado in 
what may have been a warning to marijuana businesses set to start selling mariju-
ana to recreational users in January 2014.”). 
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1. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S LAISSEZ-FAIRE APPROACH 
Without directly endorsing the legalization of marijuana, the 
Obama administration supported states’ efforts to legitimize the ma-
rijuana industry by clarifying that it would not prevent or undo those 
efforts.78 In 2009, the Department of Justice announced new en-
forcement guidelines for states that had authorized medical mariju-
ana.79 The memorandum acknowledged the federal government’s 
continued commitment to fighting the dangers of marijuana posed 
by its illegal distribution and association with violent criminal en-
terprises, but clarified that U.S. Attorneys “should not focus federal 
resources in [their] States on individuals whose actions are in clear 
and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing for 
the medical use of marijuana.”80 This enforcement policy echoed 
Obama’s campaign trail promises to respect state laws on mariju-
ana.81 
The Obama Administration reiterated its support for states’ 
thoughtful implementation of their laws legalizing both medical and 
recreational marijuana in its 2013 policy memorandum released by 
former Deputy Attorney General James Cole (“Cole Memo”).82 The 
Cole Memo attempted to provide clarity in an environment riddled 
with confusion by allocating enforcement responsibility between 
state and federal authorities.83 The memo enumerated a list of spe-
cific harms to public health, safety, and welfare and provided that 
federal resources would be committed only to the “most significant 
[marijuana] threats,” while “enforcement of state law by state and 
                                                                                                             
 78 Id. at 524–25.  
 79 DAVID W. OGDEN, DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MEMORANDUM FOR SELECTED UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON INVESTIGATIONS 
AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA 
(OCT. 19, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/leg-
acy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 524 n.21. 
 82 See generally JAMES M. COLE, DEPUTY ATT’Y GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON GUIDANCE REGARDING 
MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (AUG. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/re-
sources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [hereinafter COLE MEMO 2013]. 
 83 See id. 
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local law enforcement and regulatory bodies should remain the pri-
mary means of addressing marijuana-related activity.”84 The federal 
priorities included the following: 
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; 
Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana from 
going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; Pre-
venting the diversion of marijuana from states where 
it is legal under state law in some form to other states; 
Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from 
being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of 
other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; Prevent-
ing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation 
and distribution of marijuana; Preventing drugged 
driving and the exacerbation of other adverse public 
health consequences associated with marijuana use; 
Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands 
and the attendant public safety and environmental 
dangers posed by marijuana production on public 
lands; and Preventing marijuana possession or use on 
federal property.85 
Though not as robust as a federal legislative change, the Cole 
Memo was perceived as providing assurance that industry partici-
pants would not be prosecuted as long as they were compliant with 
the respective state’s laws on the matter, thus providing enough cer-
tainty to allow the industry to flourish.86 
Following the Department of Justice guidance, the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”)87 released its own guid-
ance, outlining proper procedures for financial institutions to follow 
                                                                                                             
 84 Id. at 3. 
 85 Id. at 1–2 (original bulleted formatting omitted). 
 86 See id.; see also Steven T. Taylor, High Expectations: Business Keeps 
Heating Up in Cannabis Law Area, OF COUNSEL, Oct. 2018 at 17–18, 
https://www.hopkinscarley.com/uploads/pdf/of-counsel-cannabis-article-10-
2018.pdf (“‘More and more law firms, including larger ones, are willing to get 
into this area,’ Heyl says. ‘They have clients with lots of money that are investing 
– and more people are recognizing that the federal government isn’t prosecuting 
so as this happens there’s less and less fear.’”). 
 87 FinCEN is an organization under the treasury department responsible for 
combatting money laundering and illegal use of U.S. financial systems. See What 
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when lending or providing banking services to the marijuana indus-
try.88 After diligently verifying that the business is compliant with 
state laws and does not implicate one of the eight priorities of the 
Cole Memo, FinCEN recommends that the “financial institution[s] 
that decide[] to provide services to a marijuana-related business . . . 
file suspicious activity reports (“SARs”).”89 Since a bank that know-
ingly conducts transactions with illegally derived funds is engaged 
in illegal money laundering under the Bank Secrecy Act,90 banks are 
required to file an SAR any time they believe such a transaction has 
occurred.91 In doing so, the bank assists law enforcement in investi-
gating the criminal activity and mitigates its own liability for money 
laundering.92 However, a high number of SARs filed for the same 
customer could indicate a bank’s controls are too lax and could sub-
ject the bank to increased regulatory scrutiny and penalties.93 
To differentiate SARs arising from state-legitimized marijuana 
businesses from SARs for traditional criminal enterprises, FinCEN 
created a three-category system.94 A “marijuana limited” filing 
acknowledges that marijuana is federally prohibited, but the bank 
has no other reason to believe the business is engaged in illegal ac-
tivity.95 A “marijuana priority” filing acts as a red flag, indicating 
that a bank believes the business is not fully compliant with the rel-
evant state laws or that the business might implicate the Cole Memo 
priorities.96 The third category is “marijuana termination,” which in-
dicates that the bank no longer believes it can remain compliant with 
anti-money laundering statutes if it continues the relationship with 
                                                                                                             
We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/what-we-do (last 
visited July 14, 2019). 
 88 FinCEN 2014 Banking Guidance, supra note 63 at 2. 
 89 Id. at 3. 
 90 Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 et. seq. (2012). 
 91 Id.; see also FinCEN 2014 Banking Guidance, supra note 63, at 4 n.7. 
 92 Gerald L. Blanchard, Reports of Suspicious Activity in Bank Secrecy Act, 
in 2 LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE, AND PREVENTION § 21:6. (2018). 
 93 See James DeFrantz, When to Hold ‘Em and When to File ‘Em—A Two 
Part Series on SAR Filings, LINKEDIN (Feb. 7, 2016), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/when-hold-em-file-em-two-part-series-sar-fil-
ings-james-defrantz?trk=prof-post. 
 94 FinCEN 2014 Banking Guidance, supra note 63 at 3–5. 
 95 Id. at 3. 
 96 Id. at 4. 
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the marijuana client because it would be supporting illegal activity 
of a company that is not compliant with state laws.97 
On one hand, the Cole Memo and FinCEN memo together 
demonstrate the Obama administration’s earnest attempt to ensure 
its laws did not stifle the growth of marijuana industries that states 
chose to legitimize.98  On the other, the three-category reporting sys-
tem requires banks to file continuing SARs throughout the year and 
constantly monitor the client to determine if it has switched catego-
ries, which comes with significant administrative burdens and costs 
that, in actuality, may be prohibitively high.99 The high regulatory 
burden may either dissuade banks from working with the marijuana 
industry, or the increased costs of compliance could be passed along 
to the customer, increasing the cost of banking for the marijuana 
industry.100 Furthermore, while the Cole Memo was more permis-
sive of transactions with state-sanctioned marijuana industries, the 
memo was not a law, and did not decriminalize transacting with the 
industry.101 Instead, it merely changed whether or not banks were 
likely to be prosecuted for those transactions, which, ultimately, was 
subject to change by the subsequent administration.102 
2. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S OPPOSITE STANCE 
Though certain banks have hesitantly begun to enter the mariju-
ana business arena, there is still great uncertainty in the industry, 
keeping otherwise ready and willing investors watching from the 
sidelines instead of contributing to the economic prosperity of a nas-
cent industry with high growth potential.103 On the campaign trail, 
then-candidate Donald Trump took the position that “enforcement 
                                                                                                             
 97 Id. at 4–5. 
 98 See Scheick, supra note 68, at 465–66. 
 99 See DeFrantz, supra note 93; Hilary V. Bricken, Navigating the Hazy Sta-
tus of Marijuana Banking, BUS. L. TODAY, Aug. 2017, at 1, 2 [hereinafter 
Bricken, Navigating the Hazy Status of Marijuana Banking]. 
 100 See Bricken, Navigating the Hazy Status of Marijuana Banking, supra note 
99, at 2. 
 101 See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7. 
 102 Id. 
 103 See id. (“Though the federal government’s Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network in 2014 produced guidelines for financial institutions to bank the mari-
juana industry, most financial institutions have elected not to participate.”). 
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of marijuana laws was a state issue.”104 However, following the 
2016 presidential elections,105 federal agencies under the Trump ad-
ministration seemed keen to abandon the Obama-era’s laissez-faire 
enforcement policies,106 resulting in a heightened awareness of the 
risks of entering an industry that is criminalized by the federal gov-
ernment.107 In 2017, the director of the U.S. Trustee Program, who 
is responsible for overseeing federal bankruptcy courts,108 stated, 
“debtors with assets or income derived from marijuana may not pro-
ceed through the bankruptcy system.”109 This is consistent with fed-
eral bankruptcy judges’ treatment of bankruptcy petitions in the ma-
rijuana industry so far, which have almost exclusively been dis-
missed.110 Further adding to the cloud of uncertainty in the industry, 
then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Cole Memo in 
2018, announcing a “return to the rule of law.”111 In his memo, Ses-
sions reminded prosecutors that violations of the CSA may also 
                                                                                                             
 104 Eileen Sullivan, Trump Says He’s Likely to Back Marijuana Bill, in Appar-
ent Break with Session, NY TIMES (June 8, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/06/08/us/politics/trump-marijuana-bill-states.html. 
 105 Harrison Smith, Donald Trump is Elected President of the United States, 




 106 See Sullivan, supra note 104. 
 107 Ben Curren, With Jeff Sessions Out, The New AG Should Advance Mariju-
ana Policy by Restoring The Cole Memorandum, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2018, 3:15 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bencurren/2018/11/07/with-jeff-sessions-out-
the-new-ag-should-restore-the-cole-memorandum/#709ec4a8705d. 
 108 U.S. Trustee Program: About the Program, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program (last visited July 22, 2019). 
 109 A Time to Reform: Oversight of the Activities of the Justice Department’s 
Civil, Tax, and Environment and Natural Resources Divisions and the U.S. Trus-
tee Program, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial, 
and Antitrust Law, U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 5 
(2017) (statement by Clifford J. White, III, Dir. of Exec. Office for U.S. Tr.), 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/file/testimony06082017.pdf/download. 
 110 See infra Part II. 
 111 Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Press Release No. 18-8, Justice 
Department Issues Memo on Marijuana Enforcement (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-marijuana-en-
forcement; see also JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III, ATT’Y GEN., MEMORANDUM FOR 
ALL UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS ON MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 4, 2018), 
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serve as the basis for prosecuting crimes under money laundering 
statutes and the Bank Secrecy Act,112 confirming a main concern 
among financial institutions.113 
Despite Sessions’ notorious opposition to the legalization of ma-
rijuana,114 the actual effects of the rescission may not be so dra-
matic.115 Sessions’ one page memo altered national policy on mari-
juana and restored prosecutorial discretion to U.S. Attorneys, direct-
ing them to “disrupt criminal organizations, tackle the growing drug 
crisis, and thwart violent crime across our country.”116 Curiously, 
this “new” directive outlines goals similar to those in the Cole 
Memo, which stated that U.S. Attorneys should remain vigilant in 
pursuit of violent drug cartels and illegal drug trafficking, so prose-
cutors may choose to act no differently than they did under the Cole 
Memo.117 Additionally, an appropriations bill dictates that the De-
partment of Justice may not use federal funds to prosecute individ-
uals in the medical marijuana businesses who are fully compliant 
with their state’s marijuana laws and regulations.118 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                             
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [hereinafter 
SESSIONS MEMO]. 
 112 Id. at 1. 
 113 See Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 7. 
 114 Sessions’ fervent disapproval of marijuana legalization is no secret, as he 
has stated ‘we need grown-ups in charge in Washington to say marijuana is not 
the kind of thing that ought to be legalized . . . it’s in fact a very real danger.” 
Curren, supra note 107. When asked about his view on the KKK in 1986, he joked 
they were “O.K. until I found out they smoked pot.” Morgan Roger, Jeff Sessions’ 
5 Craziest Quotes on Marijuana, CIVILIZED (Aug. 27, 2017), https://www.civi-
lized.life/articles/jeff-sessions-5-craziest-quotes-on-marijuana/. He later apolo-
gized for the comment and denied his sympathy for the organization but main-
tained his stance on marijuana legalization. Compare id., with Katharine Q. 
Seelye, Barack Obama, Asked About Drug History, Admits He Inhaled - Americas 
- International Herald Tribune, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2006), https://www.ny-
times.com/2006/10/24/world/americas/24iht-dems.3272493.html (discussing 
how President Obama has admitted to marijuana use in his youth, famously quip-
ping that he inhaled because “[t]hat was the point.”).  
 115 Curren, supra note 107. 
 116 Press Release No. 18-8, supra note 111. 
 117 COLE MEMO 2013, supra note 82 at 2–3; see also Curren, supra note 107. 
 118 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) (codified in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.). The bill, now known as the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, provides 
that the Department of Justice may not use federal funds to interfere with states’ 
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FinCEN’s marijuana banking guidance remains valid and continues 
to report a steady increase in the number of banks serving the mari-
juana industry,119 but, like the Cole Memo, it is merely guidance, 
not law, and cannot eliminate liability.120 
Shortly after rescinding the Cole Memo, Sessions was replaced 
by William Barr as Attorney General.121 Barr has stated that he fa-
vors a uniform, national prohibition of marijuana, but also acknowl-
edges that obtaining such a national consensus on marijuana may 
not be feasible.122 He adopts a less aggressive stance than Sessions 
by taking the position that a new law that allows states to create and 
enforce marijuana laws within their borders while maintaining har-
mony with the federal laws is preferable to the status quo, which 
simply ignores the enforcement of certain aspects of federal laws.123 
This is, in fact, exactly what the proposed STATES Act hopes to 
achieve by creating a carve-out of criminal liability under the CSA 
for marijuana businesses that are compliant with state laws.124 This 
                                                                                                             
implementation of their medical marijuana laws. Id.; see also Julie Hamill, Pro-
tection of Adult-Use Cannabis From Federal Enforcement Passes House in Re-
sounding Bipartisan Vote, CANNALAW BLOG (Jun. 22, 2019), https://www.can-
nalawblog.com/protection-of-adult-use-cannabis-from-federal-enforcement-
passes-house-in-resounding-bipartisan-vote/. This no-interference has been inter-
preted to prohibit the Department of Justice from using appropriated funds to 
prosecute individuals in the medical marijuana business who fully comply with 
their state’s laws. Id. This appropriations bill has been renewed each year since 
2014, and the proposed amendment to the 2020 appropriations bill would, if 
passed, extend this protection to recreations/adult-use state marijuana laws. Id. 
 119 FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, MARIJUANA BANKING UPDATE 1 (2018), 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Marijuana_Banking_Up-
date_September_2018.pdf. While the first quarter of 2018 saw a drop in the num-
ber of banks serving the industry, likely in response to the Sessions memo, the 
market rebounded in the second and third quarters, with the number of banks serv-
ing the marijuana industry climbing to 486. Id. at 2. 
 120 Scheick, supra note 68, at 465–66. 
 121 Sarah Lynch, Andy Sullivan, Senate Confirms William Barr as U.S. Attor-
ney General, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2019, 6:07 AM) https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-usa-trump-barr/senate-confirms-william-barr-as-attorney-general-
idUSKCN1Q31I6. 
 122 Nina Godlewski, Attorney General Barr Says He Would Favor Making 
Marijuana Illegal Across the United States, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 10, 2019, 5:32 PM) 
https://www.newsweek.com/attorney-general-barr-marijuana-law-1392561. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See STATES Act, H.R. 2093, 116th Cong. §2 (2019). 
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bill, which was originally proposed by Senators Cory Gardner and 
Elizabeth Warren, is one that President Trump has said he “probably 
will end up supporting.”125 
Marijuana businesses and their associated financial institutions 
might operate legally in the eyes of the state, but nonetheless risk 
federal prosecution for violating the CSA, anti-money laundering 
statutes, and the Bank Secrecy Act.126 The disparity of marijuana 
treatment between state and federal laws is compounded by incon-
sistent views between presidential administrations and agencies on 
whether compliance with state marijuana laws shields marijuana 
businesses and their stakeholders from federal enforcement.127 
II. THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL DISPARITIES 
As a consequence of the tension between state and federal law 
and the confusion generated by successive administrations’ dispar-
ate views on enforcement policies,128 the marijuana industry’s ac-
cess to financial resources has been stifled.129 The legal uncertain-
ties that prevent the marijuana industry from realizing its full eco-
nomic potential manifest themselves in opposite ends of a business’s 
financial life-cycle: marijuana businesses have limited access to 
U.S. capital markets, where businesses often raise the funding to 
grow,130 and to bankruptcy, where businesses in distress typically 
turn for help.131 As a result, foreign marijuana businesses are gain-
ing an advantage over similarly-situated domestic marijuana busi-
nesses,132 and lenders and marijuana businesses operate beyond the 
reach of legal enforcement mechanisms for financial obligations,133 
in the capital markets and bankruptcy realms, respectively. 
                                                                                                             
 125 Sullivan, supra note 104. 
 126 Scheick, supra note 68, at 465–66 
 127 Id. 
 128 See supra Part I. 
 129 See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 529 n.100. 
 130 See infra Part II.A 
 131 See infra Part II.B 
 132 See infra Part II.A 
 133 See infra Part II.B 
334 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:310 
 
A. Grass is Greener on the Other Side of the Border 
1. U.S. CAPITAL IS INVESTED IN FOREIGN MARIJUANA 
BUSINESSES INSTEAD OF DOMESTIC BUSINESSES 
First, capital that is ready to be invested in the industry is not 
being deployed efficiently. Shortly after the Constellation Brands-
Canopy Growth deal closed in November 2018,134 the Altria Group 
announced a $1.8 billion investment in the Cronos Group, a Cana-
dian cannabis company.135 This deal was financed by JPMorgan 
Chase Bank.136 The parallel Constellation and Altria deals both 
demonstrate the interest in and issues arising out of investing in the 
marijuana industry. In both, publicly traded U.S. companies made 
investments in the marijuana industry with the support of major U.S. 
investment banks—but the investments were both in foreign enti-
ties.137 
These deals illustrate the abundance of available capital and a 
desire by U.S. investors to put capital to use in the marijuana indus-
try.138 With such high growth rates anticipated from increased state 
legalization and large U.S. companies willing to provide bullish en-
dorsements for the product,139 the natural assumption would be that 
                                                                                                             
 134 Constellation Brands’ $5 Billion CAD ($4 Billion USD) Investment in Can-
opy Growth Closes Following Shareholder and Canadian Government Approval, 
CONSTELLATION BRANDS (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cbrands.com/news/arti-
cles/constellation-brands-5-billion-cad-4-billion-usd-investment-in-canopy-
growth-closes-following-shareholder-and-canadian-government-approval. 
 135 See Altria to Make Growth Investment in Cronos Group, BUSINESS WIRE 
(Dec. 7, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.business-
wire.com/news/home/20181207005164/en/Altria-Growth-Investment-Cronos-
Group. Altria is the U.S.-based parent company of tobacco giant, Phillip Morris. 
Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See Paul R. La Monica, Marlboro Owner Altria Invests $1.8 Billion in 
Cannabis Company Cronos, CNN BUSINESS (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:22 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/07/investing/altria-cronos-investment-mariju-
ana/index.html; Lewis, supra note 4. 
 138 See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 530. 
 139 See Lewis, supra note 4. 
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the industry is ripe for investment and prosperity.140 But willing in-
vestors have not been able to capitalize on that opportunity141 be-
cause both the FinCEN Guidance and Department of Justice en-
forcement memoranda merely diminish the likelihood banks will 
suffer consequences for violating federal law.142 They do not alter 
the substantive law to eliminate the criminality altogether.143 The 
uncertain legal environment has forced many banks and otherwise 
eager investors to remain on the sidelines grappling with the risk of 
being prosecuted or searching for an alternative, less risky way to 
invest in the marijuana industry.144 Currently, that means investing 
in foreign operations.145 
                                                                                                             
 140 See, e.g., Drew Hendricks, 5 Things Goldman Sachs Looks for in a Com-
pany Before Investing, INC. (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.inc.com/drew-hen-
dricks/5-things-goldman-sachs-look-for-in-a-company-before-investing.html. 
Growth potential is such a key factor that investment in companies in their early 
and expansion stages accounted for nearly fifty percent of venture capital invest-
ments in U.S. companies over the last five years. See PWC/CB INSIGHTS, 
MONEYTREE REPORT: Q4 2018, at 7 (2019). 
 141 See Scheuer, supra note 26, at 529–30. 
 142 Fourth Corner Credit Union v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 861 F.3d 
1052, 1055–56 (10th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (Moritz, J., concurring). 
 143 Id. 
 144 See, e.g., Leslie Picker, Meet the Banks That Are Leading the Flourishing 
Deal Market for Pot Stocks, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2018, 4:06 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/25/meet-the-banks-that-are-leading-the-deal-
market-for-pot-stocks.html. 
 145 See Lewis, supra note 4. 
. . . And, since they’re attracting so many American investors, 
some major Canadian cannabis companies are now listed on the 
more prominent U.S. stock exchanges. These Canadian opera-
tors are the companies taking on multi-billion dollar invest-
ments from the alcohol and tobacco industries. These are the 
companies that small businesses fear, resent, or hope will see 
them as an acquisition target. These are the companies that are 
already exporting to Germany and Israel, laying the ground-
work to dominate the global marijuana industry for years to 
come. 
Id. 
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2. FOREIGN MARIJUANA BUSINESSES CAN BE PUBLICLY 
TRADED ON U.S. STOCK EXCHANGES, BUT SIMILARLY-
SITUATED DOMESTIC BUSINESSES CANNOT 
Second, because of the inconsistencies between state and federal 
marijuana laws in the United States, foreign marijuana growers and 
retailers have greater access to U.S. capital markets than domestic 
companies engaged in the exact same business activities. For exam-
ple, to list on a major U.S. stock exchange like the New York Stock 
Exchange (“NYSE”) or the Nasdaq, a company must be legal in the 
jurisdiction where it operates.146 The NYSE is a self-regulating en-
tity that requires certain approvals and documentation from compa-
nies wishing to list, including a certificate of good standing from the 
jurisdiction of incorporation, a statement of legal fitness from the 
advising law firm, and a statement of financial fitness from the fi-
nancial auditing firm.147 State law governs business incorporation148 
and states that have legalized marijuana that have licensing and reg-
istration requirements can, in fact, provide a statement of good 
standing.149 The realistic roadblock, however, may be obtaining the 
credibility certifications from the law firm and accounting firm, 
which jeopardize their own reputation and liability by endorsing a 
                                                                                                             
 146 See Gene Johnson, Canadian Marijuana Company Tilray Has First US Pot 
IPO, U.S. NEWS (Jul. 19, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2018-
07-19/canadian-marijuana-company-tilray-has-first-us-pot-ipo (noting that the 
presence of institutional investors is required for such a large IPO and “[t]he les-
son is that the institutions will be there if you have a good business plan and your 
business is 100 percent legal in the jurisdiction you’re in.”); see also Jeremy 
Burke, One of the Largest Cannabis Companies Is Going Public on the New York 
Stock Exchange, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://www.busi-
nessinsider.com/aurora-cannabis-going-public-on-new-york-stock-exchange-
2018-10 (“To get listed on a US exchange like the NYSE, cannabis producers 
have to prove they are not violating any federal laws by shipping cannabis into 
the U.S . . .”). 
 147 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, The IPO Process: Prospectus in 
NYSE IPO GUIDE 35, 38–39 (Nicolas Grabar et al., 2d ed. 2013), 
https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/nyse_ipo_guide.pdf. 
 148 State Guide: Corporation Law, FINDLAW, https://smallbusi-
ness.findlaw.com/incorporation-and-legal-structures/state-guide-corporation-
laws.html (last visited July 17, 2019). 
 149 See, e.g., MARIJUANA ENF’T DIVISION, COLO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, RETAIL 
MARIJUANA BUSINESS LICENSE APPLICATION 1 (2016), https://www.colo-
rado.gov/pacific/sites/de-
fault/files/DR%208548e%20Retail%20Application%201-2017.pdf. 
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company that they know is violating federal laws.150 If all the docu-
ments are obtained, the company would need to surmount the addi-
tional legal roadblocks of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”) approval to make a public offering before it can seek 
approval from the NYSE to list.151 
As of October 17, 2018, recreational sales of marijuana are legal 
in Canada,152 so Canadian marijuana growers and retailers can, and, 
in fact have, successfully listed on U.S. stock exchanges.153 In con-
trast, U.S. marijuana growers and retailers that comply with state 
laws find themselves in legal purgatory where they may not be pros-
ecuted for violating the CSA, but are also not considered federally 
legal and will therefore not pass the rigorous approval process for 
listing on the major U.S. stock exchanges.154 In a political climate 
colored by protectionist policies intended to bolster the domestic 
economy, the laws governing the marijuana industry result in an 
                                                                                                             




Edition_1117.pdf (“the lawyers for both the underwriters and the issuer will de-
liver certain legal opinions . . . with regard to . . . no violation of the company’s 
organization documents or of any laws or agreements by which the issuer is 
bound, [and] accuracy of the disclosures”). 
 151 See id. at 27–30. 
 152 See CANADA DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 7. 
 153 Sean Williams, These 5 Pot Stocks Are Now Listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq, 
MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 7, 2018, 9:21 AM), https://www.fool.com/invest-
ing/2018/11/07/these-5-pot-stocks-are-now-listed-on-the-nyse-or-n.aspx. Can-
opy Growth, Aurora Cannabis, and Aphria are Canadian marijuana companies 
listed on the NYSE. Id. Similarly, Cronos and Tilray are both Canadian marijuana 
businesses listed on the Nasdaq. Id. 
 154 See Chloe Aiello & Kellie Ell, Tilray Joins Nasdaq in First US Cannabis 
IPO, CNBC (July 19, 2018, 10:39 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/18/til-
ray-joins-nasdaq-in-first-us-cannabis-ipo-.html. The Nasdaq and NYSE are the 
major organized stock exchanges in the United States that require companies to 
meet certain requirements to be listed. See id. In contrast, the OTC market is the 
alternative to these more reputable exchanges. See id. They have fewer listing 
requirements, are not as closely regulated, and are not as transparent as the major 
exchanges, so they are typically less desirable. Williams, supra note 153. There 
are some U.S.-based marijuana companies listed on OTC markets. See Mrinalini 
Krishna, Top Marijuana Stocks to Watch, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/investing/top-marijuana-stocks/ (last updated June 25, 2019). 
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ironic allocation of financial resources where U.S. assets can be in-
vested in foreign companies but cannot be invested in domestic 
companies engaged in the same activities.155 Furthermore, U.S. ma-
rijuana growers and retailers must look to foreign markets to pub-
licly list, and in doing so, may be required to merge into a foreign 
company.156 In either case, U.S. assets are drained from the domes-
tic economy. 
B. If It All Goes Up In Smoke, Investors and State-Sanctioned 
Marijuana Businesses Cannot Turn to the Bankruptcy Courts 
In the few instances where state-sanctioned marijuana busi-
nesses have filed for bankruptcy, their claims have been dis-
missed.157 The bankruptcy code does not explicitly prohibit state-
legalized marijuana businesses from filing a petition for bank-
ruptcy,158 but it has been interpreted by courts to prevent these busi-
nesses and their creditors from proceeding due to bad faith, for pro-
posing an illegal or infeasible plan of reorganization under Chapter 
11, for the inability of the bankruptcy trustee to legally liquidate the 
business’s assets under Chapter 7, or under the equitable doctrine of 
unclean hands. 159 As bankruptcy courts navigate an environment in 
which businesses are legal within their state, are federally recog-
nized for the purpose of tax collection, but are neither federally rec-
ognized as legal nor prosecuted for being illegal, these courts are 
uniquely positioned to define the ambiguous rights of and relation-
ships between investors and these businesses. 
Coextensive with the difficulty of raising capital in the domestic 
marijuana industry is the uncertainty of remedies and procedures if 
                                                                                                             
 155 See Aiello & Ell, supra note 154. 
 156 See Bill Hutchinson, One of California’s Biggest Cannabis Companies 
Looks to Grow Some Green on the Canadian Stock Exchange, ABC NEWS (Jun. 
10, 2019, 10:52 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/californias-biggest-
cannabis-companies-grow-green-canadian-stock/story?id=63529520. 
 157 See, e.g., Order After Hearing Dismissing Chapter 11 Case at 3, In re 
Mother Earth’s Alt. Healing Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct. 
23, 2012) [hereinafter Mother Earth Order]. 
 158 Vivian Cheng, Comment, Medical Marijuana Dispensaries in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy, 30 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 105, 106 (2013). 
 159 See id. at 113–19. 
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a business becomes insolvent.160 As the industry grows, the inevita-
bility that some businesses will not succeed requires lenders to ex-
amine their remedies in the event of a business’s failure.161 Under 
normal circumstances, these remedies are governed by federal bank-
ruptcy law.162 Once it has been proven that a business is not viable 
in its current state and has no realistic hope of surmounting its debts, 
bankruptcy allows the business to stop, evaluate its assets and what 
value it can offer to its creditors, and then move forward free of the 
weight of its past financial mistakes.163 However, the bankruptcy 
system is a creation of federal law,164 and as such, marijuana busi-
nesses have not been able to proceed with claims for relief.165 Chap-
ter 11 and Chapter 7 are the two forms most commonly used for 
businesses166 and a brief overview of each process is warranted to 
explain why neither avenue has been open to state-sanctioned mari-
juana businesses. 
1. THE CHAPTER 11 AND CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY PROCESSES 
The goal of Chapter 11 bankruptcy is to form a plan of reorgan-
ization with the understanding that creditors will ultimately be paid 
back more of their debt if they allow the business to cut some losses, 
                                                                                                             
 160 See Todd Plummer, Research Memo, Smoke & Mirrors: Bankruptcy Relief 
Remains Elusive for Marijuana Businesses and their Creditors, 8 ST. JOHN’S 
BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO 21 (2016),https://www.stjohns.edu/sites/de-
fault/files/uploads/2016-plummer_todd_research_memo_.pdf (“A corollary of 
this bloom in industry is the inevitability that sooner or later, some of these com-
panies will seek bankruptcy relief. So as public opinion evolves, laws change, and 
jurisprudence develops, one question emerges: can a medical marijuana company 
legal under state law seek relief under Title 11 of the United States Code . . . ?”). 
 161 See id. 
 162 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS 5–7 (3d 
ed. 2011), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics-
post10172005.pdf [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY BASICS]. 
 163 See id; see also Bankruptcy: Overview, Practical Law Practice Note 1-380-
9908, WESTLAW (last visited July 22, 2019) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Practice 
Note]. 
 164 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 162, at 5. Congress has the authority to 
enact nationwide bankruptcy laws under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Consti-
tution. Id. The Federal Bankruptcy Code, codified in Title 11 of the U.S. Code, 
and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure govern all bankruptcy proceed-
ings. Id. 
 165 See Plummer, supra note 160; see also infra Part II.B. 
 166 See Bankruptcy Practice Note, supra note 162. 
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pursue a new strategy to continue operating, and pay back loans over 
a longer period of time.167 A debtor can file for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy voluntarily or creditors wishing to enforce payment of the 
debtor’s obligations can force the debtor into involuntary Chapter 
11 bankruptcy.168 Often, the debtor itself, or the debtor with the help 
of a plan sponsor, will manage the process as the “Debtor in Posses-
sion.”169 This allows the business to both remain in possession of its 
assets and remain functional while it forms a plan of reorganiza-
tion.170 After filing the bankruptcy petition, the debtor has sixty days 
to file a disclosure statement including a description of the business, 
its financial information, its reasons for filing for bankruptcy, a liq-
uidation analysis, and an initial description of the Chapter 11 plan, 
essentially justifying why the business seeks the dismissal of certain 
debts under bankruptcy laws.171 The Debtor in Possession has 120 
days after filing the petition to present the reorganization plan out-
lining revenue streams, sources and uses of capital, and the repay-
ment plan for each creditor, including sacrifices it requires them to 
accept.172 After creditor approval, the reorganization plan is pre-
sented to the bankruptcy court judge for approval.173 If it is ap-
proved, the debtor can successfully emerge from bankruptcy and 
continue its operations as a re-organized, recapitalized entity with 
new repayment plans for its secured lenders and all remaining debts 
extinguished.174 However, if the court does not approve the plan, the 
case may be dismissed or converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation.175 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy provides a court-managed process for liq-
uidating all of the business’s assets when there is no viable way for 
the business to continue.176 The key distinction between Chapter 11 
and Chapter 7 processes, for the purposes of this Note, is that all of 
                                                                                                             
 167 See id. 
 168 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012); see also BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 
162, at 29. 
 169 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101–07; see also Christopher R. Kaup & J. Daryl Dorsey, 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A Primer, GPSOLO, July/August 2011, at 49. 
 170 Kaup & Dorsey, supra note 169, at 49. 
 171 11 U.S.C. § 1125; see also Kaup & Dorsey, supra note 169, at 50. 
 172 11 U.S.C. § 1121; see also Kaup & Dorsey, supra note 169, at 50–51. 
 173 11 U.S.C. § 1128. 
 174 BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 162, at 39–40. 
 175 See id. at 38. 
 176 See id. at 6–7. 
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the debtor’s assets come under the control of the U.S. Trustee in the 
event of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.177 The assets of the business are sold 
at auction and the money is used to provide as much value to the 
creditors as possible.178 While individuals’ debts are discharged in 
personal Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings, corporations and part-
nerships that are liquidated under Chapter 7 do not receive a dis-
charge of their debts.179 The Trustee simply liquidates all of the 
business’s assets and pays creditors to the extent possible.180 At that 
point, the unpaid creditors will only be able to recover from the busi-
ness’s managers and individuals, if the managers are personally lia-
ble for the company’s remaining debts.181 
2. DISMISSAL FOR BAD FAITH 
Under Chapter 11, the first challenge marijuana businesses face 
is surviving dismissal for a lack of good faith bankruptcy filing un-
der 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b).182 Section 1112(b) enumerates a list of 
grounds for a “for cause” dismissal of bankruptcy and, while good 
faith is not explicitly stated, courts have widely read a lack of good 
faith in filing a petition as cause for dismissal.183 In In re CGO En-
terprises, a Colorado dispensary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
was challenged by the U.S. Trustee on several good faith grounds.184 
The Trustee argued that the debtor initiated the petition in bad faith, 
knowing that it could not produce a confirmable reorganization 
                                                                                                             
 177 See id. at 18 (“The primary role of a chapter 7 trustee in an asset case is to 
liquidate the debtor’s nonexempt assets in a manner that maximizes the return to 
the debtor’s unsecured creditors. The trustee accomplishes this by selling the 
debtor’s property . . .”). 
 178 Id. at 15, 18. 
 179 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2012); see also BANKRUPTCY BASICS, supra note 
162, at 15. 
 180 Bethany K. Laurence, Chapter 7 Bankruptcy for Corporations and LLCs, 
BANKRUPTCY SITE, https://www.thebankruptcysite.org/resources/bankruptcy/ 
chapter-7-bankruptcy-corporations-and-llcs.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 181 See id. 
 182 See Cheng, supra note 158, at 108–09, 113–16. 
 183 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b); see also Cheng, supra note 158, at 108–09, 113–16. 
 184 United States Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss This Chapter 11 Case Pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) at 2–3, In re CGO Enterprise L.L.C., No. 12-19010 
(Bankr. D. Colo. May 16, 2012), 2012 WL 1962267 [hereinafter CGO Motion to 
Dismiss]. 
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plan.185  To confirm a plan, the court must find it is a viable plan for 
continuing operations that is “not by any means forbidden by 
law.”186 As the plan would have to be funded by the illegal sale of 
marijuana under the CSA, the Trustee argued that the plan could not 
be confirmed.187 The second argument was that CGO failed to file 
timely documents, which was grounds for dismissal.188 CGO with-
drew its petition, conceding to the failure to file timely documents, 
but rejected the notion that any plan would have been illegal.189 Cu-
riously, the debtor’s withdrawal was driven by its own concerns 
about the feasibility of its reorganization plan due to complications 
regarding the ownership of the cannabis plants and ability to include 
them in the estate.190 While “CGO legally ‘owned’ all medical ma-
rijuana plants it produced, the applicable state regulators believe[d] 
individual plants are only owned for the ‘benefit of’ or on ‘behalf 
of’ named individual patients, and the applicable state regulators 
[did] not believe that a trustee could exercise any control or domin-
ion over medical marijuana plants.”191 
3. DISMISSAL FOR ILLEGAL OR INFEASIBLE  
REORGANIZATION PLANS 
While 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) requires bankruptcy petitions to be 
filed in good faith in order to seek financial relief and repayment for 
creditors,192 11 U.S.C. § 1129 requires a reorganization plan to be 
financially viable.193 In California, Mother Earth’s Alternative 
Healing Cooperative’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition194  illustrates 
                                                                                                             
 185 See id. at 3. 
 186 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3). 
 187 CGO Motion to Dismiss, supra note 184, at 3. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Debtor’s Joint Response to Trustee’s Motion to Dismiss and Order to File 
Status Report at 1–2, In re CGO Enter. L.L.C., No. 12-19010 (Bankr. D. Colo. 
May 25, 2012), 2012 WL 1932712 [hereinafter Debtor’s Response to Motion to 
Dismiss]. 
 190 See id. at 1. 
 191 Id. 
 192 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012). 
 193 11 U.S.C. § 1129. 
 194 Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Mother Earth’s Alternative Healing 
Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jul 25, 2012), http://bank-
rupt.com/misc/casb12-10223.pdf. 
2019] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 343 
 
the challenges of surmounting the good faith hurdle under Section 
1112(b), as well as two key factors a court must find to confirm the 
plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1129.195 Mother Earth openly admitted its 
goal in seeking bankruptcy protection was to avoid eviction.196 The 
southern California medical marijuana dispensary was fully compli-
ant with California state laws, but alleged that its landlord had been 
receiving pressure from the federal government to evict the busi-
ness.197 The judge noted that the “[d]ebtor fil[ing] this bankruptcy 
solely to preserve a lease” was grounds for dismissal.198 Further-
more, to win court approval, a plan must “not [be] by any means 
forbidden by law” 199 and must be feasible.200  The judge found the 
only means of funding a plan would have been “by criminally illegal 
means,” and the viability of the plan was further compromised be-
cause any proceeds the business received under the plan “would 
have been subject to forfeiture and, therefore, [were] illusory.”201 
4. DISMISSAL FOR INABILITY OF THE TRUSTEE TO LEGALLY 
LIQUIDATE ASSETS 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases have been dismissed primarily be-
cause of the inability of the Trustee to legally sell the marijuana as-
sets.202 Because the bankruptcy trustee manages the liquidation pro-
cess of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a bankruptcy court in Colorado held 
that “the trustee could neither ‘take control of the Debtor’s Prop-
erty . . . ‘ nor ‘liquidate the inventory of marijuana plants . . . ‘ with-
out violating § 841(a) of the CSA.” 203  The court’s dismissal in 
Mother Earth similarly refused to convert the Chapter 11 petition to 
                                                                                                             
 195 Order After Hearing Dismissing Chapter 11 Case at 3, In re Mother Earth’s 
Alt. Healing Coop., Inc., No. 12-10223-11 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2012) [here-
inafter Mother Earth Order]. 
 196 See Stephanie Gleason, Chapter 420?, WALL ST. J.: BLOG (Jul. 27, 2012, 
10:47 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2012/07/27/chapter-420/. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Mother Earth Order, supra note 195, at 2. 
 199 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (2012). 
 200 See id. § 1129(a)(11). 
 201 Mother Earth Order, supra note 195, at 2. 
 202 See, e.g., id. at 3. 
 203 Plummer, supra note 160 (quoting In re Arenas, 514 B.R. 887, 892 (Bankr. 
D. Colo. 2014)). 
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a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding because the bankruptcy “trustee 
cannot be forced to engage in illegal activity.”204 
5. DISMISSAL FOR “UNCLEAN HANDS” 
In addition to the debtor’s inability to proceed with bankruptcy 
claims, courts have also denied creditors of marijuana businesses 
access to bankruptcy courts under the unclean hands doctrine. As a 
court of equity, the bankruptcy court’s available remedies are in-
formed by the notion that “a plaintiff asking a court for equitable 
relief ‘must come with clean hands.’”205 When creditors brought an 
involuntary Chapter 7 petition to force an Arizona medical mariju-
ana dispensary into bankruptcy, they were met with little sympathy 
from the bankruptcy court.206 Illustrating a key danger of the con-
tinued tension between federal and state law for investors, the dis-
pensary was able to escape liability for its debts by using its own 
federal illegality as a defense.207 It used the unclean hands doctrine 
to argue that its creditors “knew or should have known that 
Medpoint’s activities were illegal under federal law” and therefore 
the creditors were not eligible to seek relief under the federal bank-
ruptcy laws.208 Reluctantly persuaded by Medpoint’s argument, the 
court ruled in favor of the debtor, finding both unclean hands of the 
petitioner and risk for the trustee who would have had to liquidate 
the marijuana assets if the Chapter 7 liquidation were allowed to 
proceed.209 
                                                                                                             
 204 Mother Earth Order, supra note 195, at 3. 
 205 Northbay Wellness Grp., Inc. v. Beyries, 789 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(quoting Johnson v. Yellow Cab Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383, 387 (1944)). 
 206 See In re Medpoint Management, LLC, 528 B.R. 178, 186–88 (Bankr. D. 
Ariz. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 2016 WL 3251581 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. June 
3, 2016) (“Medpoint did not dupe [the creditors] into entering the medical mari-
juana business. . . . Petitioning Creditors may themselves have also violated the 
CSA and attempted to profit from those violations.”). 
 207 See id. at 188 (“The Court has neither the authority nor the will to enter an 
order for relief or endanger a trustee who might be assigned to administer drug 
tainted assets for the benefit of creditors who assumed the risk of doing business 
with an enterprise engaged in violations of federal law.”). 
 208 Id. at 186–87. 
 209 Id.; see also Chemerinsky et al., supra note 35, at 96-97 (describing a case 
almost parallel to Medpoint: Judgment of Dismissal, Hammer v. Today’s Health 
Care II, CV2011-051310 (Ariz. Super. Ct. April 17, 2012)). 




III. BANKRUPTCY COURTS ARE UNIQUELY POSITIONED TO 
REMEDY CERTAIN FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES BY ALLOWING 
STATE-SANCTIONED MARIJUANA BUSINESSES ACCESS TO THE 
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM 
As social acceptance of marijuana broadens,210 the business and 
legal arenas must work together to create stability. While insolvency 
is a fate debtors and creditors alike hope to avoid,211 the bankruptcy 
system has a stabilizing effect on markets by identifying the best 
outcome in a bad situation.212 “The Bankruptcy Code [] does not 
explicitly prohibit [marijuana businesses] from filing for bank-
ruptcy”213 and should therefore be made accessible to the state-le-
gitimized marijuana industry. 
A. Better Alignment with the Goals of Bankruptcy 
There are many instances in which discrepancies between state 
and federal marijuana laws have created confusion, including issues 
of tax violations and employee terminations for positive marijuana 
tests.214 The key distinction between those laws and bankruptcy law, 
                                                                                                             
The court recognized the absurdity of this result—excusing the 
defendants from repaying the loan because they were, in the 
eyes of the law, drug dealers—but was unwilling to give the 
plaintiffs the benefit of their bargain when the conduct envi-
sioned by the agreement remained illegal under federal law. 
Id. 
 210 See McCarthy, supra note 36. 
 211 See Bill Fay, What is Insolvency?, DEBT.ORG, https://www.debt.org/faqs/ 
insolvency/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
 212 See Gamble, supra note 31 (“Bankruptcy is the most important part of any 
economic crisis. It is the plumbing of economics. It allows the market to flush 
away the inefficient businesses and reallocate capital to efficient businesses.”). 
 213 Cheng, supra note 158, at 106. 
 214 For example, tax violations and employee terminations for testing positive 
for marijuana illuminate tension between state and federal laws. Alterman v. 
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1452, (T.C. 2018) (finding tax 
penalties for under-reporting income valid when the business deducted business 
expenses from its gross income—a standard practice for most businesses, but not 
allowed for marijuana businesses); see also Canna Care, Inc. v. Comm’r, 110 
T.C.M. (CCH) 408 (T.C. 2015), aff’d sub nom. Canna Care, Inc. v. Comm’r of 
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however, is that the law in those cases was used to prosecute viola-
tions within its reach, while bankruptcy laws are voluntarily sought 
out by those who seek to benefit from its financial forgiveness.215 
Even in circumstances where the creditor forces the debtor into in-
voluntary bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court does not weigh criminal 
issues, but rather equitable issues of financial misfortunes or mis-
management.216 Bankruptcy courts serve an economic purpose ra-
ther than a criminal purpose, so whether a business can or cannot 
access the bankruptcy framework should be a question of economic 
benefit rather than a question of legal harmony under the preemption 
doctrine.217 Both Congress and bankruptcy judges have noted that 
the bankruptcy courts are courts of limited jurisdiction to address 
financial affairs.218 Bankruptcy courts in the past have limited their 
                                                                                                             
Internal Revenue, 694 F. App’x 570 (9th Cir. 2017) (“we find that petitioner was 
involved in the trade or business of trafficking in a controlled substance within 
the meaning of the CSA that was prohibited by law during the years at issue. We 
hold that section 280E prohibits petitioner from deducting any amounts paid or 
incurred during the years at issue in connection with its trade or business that 
respondent disallowed”); Coats v. Dish Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147, 150–52 
(COA 2013) (holding plaintiff’s medical marijuana use, though legal in Colorado, 
illegal under the federal CSA, and therefore reasonable grounds for employment 
termination); see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 35, at 98 n.88 (detailing a number 
of cases addressing employment termination after failing a marijuana drug test). 
 215 “One of the primary purposes of [the federal bankruptcy law] is to ‘relieve 
the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness, and permit him to 
start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon busi-
ness misfortunes.’” In re Perrotta, 406 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (quot-
ing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (alterations in original). 
 216 See Cheng, supra note 158, at 118–20. 
 217 See id. at 119–21. 
 218 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 486–501 (2011). The Court held that 
bankruptcy courts are not mere adjuncts of Article III Courts and, therefore, the 
bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgement on a non-bankruptcy issue was un-
constitutional. See id. This is because Bankruptcy Courts are not Article III courts 
under the constitution, but rather, courts whose authority is derived from an act of 
Congress. See id. As a result, the judges do not have the same salary and tenure 
protections as Article III judges meant to protect them from political influence in 
their decision-making. See id. To allow a bankruptcy court to decide matters that 
are not related to bankruptcy, but are civil rights or criminal in nature, would allow 
such crucial rights to be “taken from the Article III Judiciary . . . [and] Article III 
would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of 
powers we have long recognized.” Id. at 495. 
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analysis of reorganization plans to its financial feasibility of the plan 
and the interests of its creditors, declining to opine on questionable 
legalities and suggesting that such an inquiry would be “contrary to 
the ‘basic function of bankruptcy judges in bankruptcy proceed-
ings.’”219 This Note by no means suggests that bankruptcy courts 
should open their doors to the black market; rather, it proposes that 
where one governing body—in this case, the state—has determined 
that it is in the public interest to legitimize an industry, and the con-
flicting governing body—the federal government—has demon-
strated it is not in the public interest to cripple the states’ efforts, 
bankruptcy courts should fulfill their economic role by providing a 
predictable and organized process for businesses and lenders 
alike.220 
Furthermore, the tests applied in each bankruptcy process to de-
termine whether a petition should survive dismissal are concerned 
with detecting abuse of the bankruptcy system to hide value or 
fraudulently escape liability for debts, not “abuses” directed at de-
termining the criminality of state-approved actions.221 While CGO 
and Mother Earth’s Healing Cooperative’s dismissals both noted a 
good faith violation because of the marijuana in the reorganization 
plan, neither one was dismissed exclusively on a finding that any 
reorganization plan based on the sale of marijuana is unconfirma-
ble.222 Rather, both cases included additional reasoning that would 
have been grounds for dismissal regardless of the marijuana, so it is 
not clear that a debtor’s characterization as a marijuana business 
alone precludes it from proceeding with bankruptcy.223 Under a 
                                                                                                             
 219 Cheng, supra note 158, at 120–21 (2013) (quoting In Re Food City Hall at 
812). 
 220 See Gamble, supra note 31 (“To accurately determine the risk of these in-
vestments, it is important to look beyond the numbers to the legal institutions that 
provide transparency and consistency, because when things go sour, they are your 
only protection.”). 
 221 See Cheng, supra note 158, at 110. 
 222 See CGO Motion to Dismiss, supra note 184, at 2–3; Mother Earth Order, 
supra note 195, at 2–3. 
 223 Mother Earth had an improper purpose for filing because it was trying to 
escape eviction rather than accomplish the goals of bankruptcy, which are to pro-
vide as much value as possible to creditors before making a fresh start. See Mother 
Earth Order, supra note 195, at 2; see also Debtor’s Response to Motion to Dis-
miss, supra note 189, at 1. 
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Chapter 11 reorganization, the court has a fiduciary duty to apply 
the best interest of the creditors test.224 The test considers which as-
sets to pay the business’s creditors with and whether it is in the best 
interest of the creditors for the business to continue so it could po-
tentially repay some on an extended timeline or whether the credi-
tors would be better served by liquidating the company’s assets.225 
CGO openly admitted it did not have enough assets to proceed fur-
ther with Chapter 11 bankruptcy and unilaterally determined it 
would not pass the best interest test.226 However, if a marijuana busi-
ness’s reorganization plan is compliant with state laws and survives 
the best interest test, the creditors should be allowed to benefit from 
that plan. 
In determining the validity of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy 
proceedings, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that the basic 
federal rule in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance of 
claims” because the debtor’s obligation to pay stems from a con-
tract.227 The creditor’s right to enforce payment is determined by the 
contract between the debtor and the creditor, which is a matter of 
state law since “[p]roperty interests are created and defined by state 
law.”228 A contract that is illegal is unenforceable,229 but the federal 
prohibition of marijuana under the CSA that renders the contract il-
legal is in direct conflict with the state law that is determinative of 
the contract’s validity.230 Assuming the business is compliant with 
state marijuana laws, the contract is valid in the eyes of the state and 
“[u]nless some federal interest requires a different outcome, there is 
no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply 
                                                                                                             
 224 11 U.S.C. §1129(a)(7) (2012); see also Jonathan Hicks, Note, Foxes 
Guarding the Henhouse: The Modern Best Interests of Creditors Test in Chapter 
11 Reorganizations, 5 NEV. L.J. 820, 831 (2005). 
 225 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7). 
 226 See Debtor’s Response to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 189, at 1. 
 227 Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 
450 (2007). 
 228 Id. at 451 (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)) (alter-
ations in original). 
 229 George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGS 
L.J. 347, 357 (1961) (“an illegal contract is one that is unenforceable as a matter 
of policy because enforcement would be injurious to the best interest of the pub-
lic.”). 
 230 Compare Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 Schedule 1(c)(10), 
841 (2012), with CAL. BUS. & PROF. §26000(b) (2016). 
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because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.”231 Not only does the federal government have an interest in 
enforcing the CSA, but it also has an interest in the economic pros-
perity of its citizens in every state.232 While a traditional federal 
court might weigh the legal harmony interests of preemption higher 
than the economic interest, as discussed, it is more consistent with 
the bankruptcy courts’ role to focus on the economic interests. 
B. Benefits to Industry and Investors Outweigh the Risks to the 
Bankruptcy System 
Bankruptcy access alone cannot address all of the burning ques-
tions of financial institutions evaluating an investment in the domes-
tic marijuana market, but it is one necessary component of creating 
a business environment positioned for growth.233 A major goal of 
the states’ legalization programs is to eliminate the harms caused by 
the illegal marijuana trade.234 If the states hope to drive business 
away from the illegal market, the legitimate market needs to be large 
enough to absorb demand and to offer prices that consumers are 
willing to pay.235 Otherwise, states’ efforts may be thwarted by con-
sumers turning to the black market for cheaper or more accessible 
products.236 If investors have assurance that they will be able to en-
force their loans and obtain their collateral through bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, they will be more likely to lend to the industry. As the 
                                                                                                             
 231 Travelers Cas., 549 U.S. at 451 (quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 55). 
 232 See generally Proclamation No. 9816, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,457 (Nov. 6, 2018). 
 233 See Gamble, supra note 31 (“[C]redit is essential to economic growth. In 
game theory, a debtor’s best move is not to repay the debt. Creditors know this 
and their best move is not to lend. So without adequate legal protections, eco-
nomic growth can come to an end.”). 
 234 See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 158, at 140. 
 235 ADAM ORENS ET AL., MARIJUANA POLICY GROUP & UNIV. COLO. 
BOULDER, COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MARKET SIZE AND DEMAND 




 236 Id.; see also Jeff Desjardins, California’s Recreational Cannabis Industry 
Is Booming—But Regulations Are Posing a Unique Threat, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Aug. 28, 2018, 6:45 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/californias-recrea-
tional-cannabis-industry-is-booming-but-regulations-are-posing-a-unique-threat-
2018-8. 
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availability of funding for the industry grows, so too will the indus-
try’s competition and its ability to fully address demand.237 In-
creased competition improves quality and drives down prices, which 
ultimately benefits consumers, the economy, and states’ efforts to 
drive business away from the illegal drug trade.238 
Even if the legislature were to make an exception to legal liabil-
ity for banks that lend to marijuana industries, lenders still face the 
risk of being left with no way to enforce their loans through bank-
ruptcy proceedings if the business fails.239 Access to the bankruptcy 
system adds security to the market and increases growth by provid-
ing a predictable, navigable process for debtors and creditors, thus 
allowing the industry to achieve greater scale by encouraging more 
lending. It allows debtors in financial distress to start fresh, hope-
fully bringing some financial management lessons to future pur-
suits.240  Further, bankruptcy proceedings allow creditors a legal 
means of enforcing their unpaid loans and maximizing the value of 
their recovery in the event of insolvency.241 The continuing recovery 
of the U.S. economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis is a 
                                                                                                             
 237 See Desjardins, supra note 236; see also ORENS ET AL., supra note 235, at 
14–15. 
 238 Cf. ORENS ET AL., supra note 235, at 14–15. 
 239 For an illustration of forfeiture and of how mere promises of safe-harbor 
from criminal liability alone are insufficient to encourage meaningful banking ac-
tivity in the industry, see Chemerinsky et al., supra note 35, at 93. 
[E]ven if the federal government were to promise never to pur-
sue money laundering charges against those banks doing busi-
ness with the marijuana industry, it is not at all clear that banks 
would actually begin to treat marijuana businesses the way they 
treat other businesses. Because the CSA and its forfeiture pro-
visions remain good law, the assets of a marijuana business re-
main subject to forfeiture even in the face of a federal promise 
not to pursue such actions, and it is difficult to see how those 
assets could be seen by a bank as sufficiently secure against 
government seizure to be worth the risk. It was for this reason 
that the reaction of the marijuana industry to the new banking 
guidelines was decidedly tepid. 
Id. (citing Evan Perez, Banks Cleared to Accept Marijuana Business, CNN (Feb. 
17, 8:39 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/14/politics/u-s-marijuana-banks). 
 240 See In re Perrotta, 406 B.R. 1, 7 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009) (quoting Local Loan 
Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)). 
 241 Hicks, supra note 224, at 831; see also Gamble, supra note 31. 
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salient illustration of the economic function of the bankruptcy sys-
tem.242 More than ten years after Lehman Brothers declared Chapter 
11 bankruptcy, launching the tailspin of the U.S. stock market, the 
deal negotiated during the bankruptcy process is credited as one that 
“helped avert ‘an even greater economic calamity.’”243 Over $130 
billion in claim settlements have been paid and the process is still 
ongoing.244 It is unclear what, if any, recovery creditors would have 
had without bankruptcy.245 
The federal government has not actively condoned state-legal-
ized marijuana businesses, nor has it condemned businesses that 
openly seek to expand in compliance with states’ laws.246  If federal 
bankruptcy courts were to start allowing marijuana businesses or 
their creditors to proceed with bankruptcy claims as regular busi-
nesses, there are, of course, inherent risks. Broadly speaking, deci-
sions may be overturned or a circuit split may emerge as bankruptcy 
petitions make their way through the courts in each legalized state. 
A circuit split would detract from the market-stabilizing investment 
security that bankruptcy can provide. However, this would likely 
encourage forum-shopping behavior and consequential migration of 
funding and the associated growth to states in jurisdictions that pro-
vide security in bankruptcy procedures. Furthermore, in finding that 
the personal mandate of the Affordable Care Act was a legal tax, not 
an illegal penalty, the Supreme Court “estimated that four million 
people each year will choose to pay the IRS rather than buy insur-
ance”247 and reasoned “that Congress regards such extensive failure 
to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did 
                                                                                                             
 242 See, e.g., Matt Egan, The US Economy Just Hit a Milestone, CNN (May 1, 
2018, 10:57 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/01/news/economy/us-econ-
omy-great-recession-recovery/index.html. 
 243 Lehman Brothers $11bn Case Against Barclays Fails, BBC NEWS (Feb. 
23, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-12549242. 
 244 Renea Merle, A Guide to the Financial Crisis—10 Years Later, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-
guide-to-the-financial-crisis--10-years-later/2018/09/10/114b76ba-af10-11e8-
a20b-5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.5c5dbcd59242. 
 245 See id. 
 246 There has certainly been verbal political condemnation, but to date, there 
seems to have been little condemnation actions against those in compliance with 
state marijuana laws and federal tax reporting requirements. See infra Part I.B. 
 247 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 568 (2012). 
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not think it was creating four million outlaws.”248 Similarly, there 
are currently over 1.2 million registered medical marijuana users in 
California and thirty-nine million consumers.249 Recreational mari-
juana is now legalized in California, and therefore available to more 
than thirty-nine million people.250 With nine other recreational 
states and thirty-two other medical states’ populations,251 the num-
ber of people exposed to the risk of violations under the CSA as 
consumers and business owners far exceeds the four million people 
the Supreme Court was concerned with criminalizing in NFIB v. 
Sebelius.252  With such a large number of people at risk, it is unlikely 
that the federal government would remain fairly passive in the face 
of a growing population if it intended for all these people to be con-
sidered outlaws. 
Additionally, the individual bankruptcy trustees who take con-
trol of assets may be exposed to criminal liability for selling mariju-
ana in a Chapter 7 liquidation or for supporting the sale of marijuana 
in the event of approval of a reorganization plan.253 However, there 
are a few reassurances that these individuals are unlikely to suffer 
the consequences of that risk. A federal appropriations bill does not 
allow the use of federal funds to prosecute medical marijuana busi-
nesses that are in compliance with their state laws.254 If the federal 
government has determined it would be a waste of money to go after 
state-compliant businesses, it would likely be an even more egre-
gious waste of federal resources to prosecute the U.S. Trustees per-
forming the debt distributing functions of the bankruptcy court. In 
fact, the Ninth Circuit in United State v. McIntosh allowed a group 
of ten marijuana dispensaries to enjoin the Department of Justice’s 
                                                                                                             
 248 Id. 
 249 See Medical Marijuana Patient Numbers, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT, 
https://www.mpp.org/issues/medical-marijuana/state-by-state-medical-mariju-
ana-laws/medical-marijuana-patient-numbers/ (last updated July 10, 2019). 
 250 See Desjardins, supra note 236. 
 251 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 252 See Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 568 (2012). 
 253 See, e.g., In re Medpoint Management, LLC, 528 B.R. 178, 186–88 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 2016 WL 3251581 (B.A.P. 9th 
Cir. June 3, 2016). 
 254 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) (codified in scattered sections of 
the U.S.C.); see also Bricken, Funding and Financing, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
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prosecution efforts, finding that the prosecution under the CSA vio-
lated the appropriations bill.255 
CONCLUSION 
The reality of state-by-state marijuana legalization is that a 
quasi-legal marijuana industry now exists in the United States. Le-
gal uncertainties regarding federal liability and enforcement, how-
ever, have limited the industry’s access to resources, thus limiting 
the economic benefits that states can realize from a prospering and 
expanding industry. As the wave of state recreational marijuana le-
galization gains momentum, the importance of legal clarity on the 
issue grows because the missed business opportunities are that much 
larger. Federal and state views on the legality of marijuana remain 
divergent, but the belief that corporate bankruptcy is an important 
strategic business tool is a view upon which the government stands 
united.256 By granting state-legitimized marijuana businesses access 
                                                                                                             
 255 United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 256 “The 1978 Bankruptcy Code profoundly changed the bankruptcy system 
and its importance in society and the economy. . . . By making bankruptcy more 
attractive for corporations as well, [the 1978 Bankruptcy Code] routinized corpo-
rate bankruptcy, turning it into a business and strategic decision rather than a last 
resort.” Todd J. Zywicki, The Past, Present, and Future of Bankruptcy Law in 
America, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2016, 2021 (2003). In 2005, Bankruptcy Code re-
forms to ensure bankruptcy remains a legitimate tool, and not a tool abused by 
bad-faith actors to escape their responsibilities passed with bipartisan support. See 
BAPCPA: Know Your Bankruptcy Rights, DEBT.COM (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.debt.com/bankruptcy/abuse-prevention-and-consumer-protection-
act/. The importance of access to bankruptcy, especially for small businesses, con-
tinues to receive attention and support from democrats and republicans alike. On 
the legislative branch, see, e.g., Press Release, Collins, Bipartisan Colleagues In-
troduce Legislation to Help Small Businesses Restructure Debt, (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://dougcollins.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/collins-bipartisan-col-
leagues-introduce-legislation-help-small (quoting Republican Senator Grassley 
explaining that “[a] well-functioning bankruptcy system, specifically for small 
businesses, allows businesses to reorganize, preserve jobs, maximize the value of 
assets and ensure the proper allocation of resources” and Democratic Senator 
Whitehouse opining that “[s]mall businesses form the backbone of the American 
economy. When these businesses are struggling, the bankruptcy process should 
give them a chance to reorganize to preserve jobs and boost local communities.”). 
For perspective on the executive branch, see, e.g., Clare O’Connor, Fourth Time’s 
A Charm: How Donald Trump Made Bankruptcy Work for Him, FORBES (Apr. 
29, 2011, 7:31 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/clareoconnor/2011/04/29/ 
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to the federal bankruptcy system, the government can bolster the in-
dustry’s access to capital and access to remedies when the capital 
runs out. Doing so certainly does not address all the qualms facing 
the industry but increases the likelihood that marijuana businesses 
and U.S. investors can capitalize on opportunities of the domestic 
marijuana industry, regardless of when or how the federal govern-
ment confronts the increasing divide between state and federal ma-
rijuana laws. 
 
                                                                                                             
fourth-times-a-charm-how-donald-trump-made-bankruptcy-work-for-
him/#6cc9f7007ffa. For the judicial branch, see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 244 (1934). 
 
